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Book Review
Whither the Conflict over Agricultural
Biotechnology?
GENES, TRADE, AND REGULATION: THE SEEDS OF CONFLICT
IN FOOD BIOTECHNOLOGY. By Thomas Bernauer. 2003.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Pp. vi, 229.
Reviewed by Charles R. McManis*
If you take seriously recent admonitions that Americans
(and their government) should devote a bit more attention over
the next four years to listening to what Europeans have to say,1
you would do well to read Genes, Trade, and Regulation: The
Seeds of Conflict in Food Biotechnology. In this book, Thomas
Bernauer, a professor of political science at the Swiss Federal
Institute of Technology and a widely published author on
international economic and environmental issues, offers a
European perspective on the growing global regulatory
polarization and trade conflicts that have engulfed the debate
over agricultural biotechnology, or “agri-biotech.” Professor
Bernauer also explains how and why that regulatory
polarization has developed, assesses the likelihood of escalation
in the conflict, and concludes with some useful suggestions for
policy reform that could help avoid the “seemingly unavoidable
trajectory that leads from regulatory polarization to trade
conflict to stagnation or decline of agri-biotech[]” (p. 3).
Professor Bernauer is certainly correct that “an increasing
gap is developing between agri-biotech promoting and agribiotech restricting countries, both in terms of approval and
* Thomas and Karole Green Professor of Law and Director of the LLM
Program in Intellectual Property and Technology Law at Washington
University in St. Louis School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Read My Ears, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27,
2005, at A27.
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labeling regulation and at the market level” (p. 8). As he notes,
the hardcore promoters of agricultural biotechnology include
the United States, Canada, and Argentina, while the opposition
clusters around the European Union (p. 8). Many other
countries, particularly developing countries, find themselves
caught in the middle of this increasingly fractious dispute (pp.
8-9). If you need a quick refresher on how the international
controversy over agricultural biotechnology unfolded, Professor
Bernauer does a very competent job in laying out the various
challenges posed by agricultural biotechnology (ch. 2), the
regulatory and market responses to it in a range of countries
(ch. 3), as well as the interest group politics, or “bottom up”
forces (ch. 4), and the “top-down” governmental interactions
(ch. 5) that account for the severity of the regulatory
polarization and trade conflicts that agricultural biotechnology
has generated.
As Bernauer correctly observes, differences between the
European Union and the United States are at the heart of the
conflict between agri-biotech promoting and agri-biotech
restricting countries (p. 8). He is also correct that this
transatlantic conflict is likely to escalate in the near future (pp.
13-15). Indeed, a World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute
panel for a proceeding brought by the United States, Canada,
and Argentina against the European Union over the latter’s de
facto moratorium on the approval and marketing of biotech
products estimates that it will issue the report to the parties by
the end of June 2005.2
At the heart of Professor Bernauer’s book are his
predictions in Chapter 6 on the likely outcome of this WTO
dispute and its probable consequences (pp. 118-67). He argues
that it is far from clear whether the United States will win this
case as a legal matter, and even if it does, he believes it
unlikely that the European Union will back down and change
its regulations in line with American requests (p. 149). Nor
does he believe it likely that the European Union will acquiesce
in any WTO approved punitive measures by the United States,
as it did in an earlier WTO case involving a successful
2. Communication of the Chairman of the Panel in European
Communities, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and
Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/27, WT/DS292/21, WT/DS293/21
(Nov.
2,
2004),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm (last visited
Apr. 8, 2005).
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American challenge to a European Union ban on the
importation of meat from farm animals treated with growth
promotion hormones (pp. 149, 160-61). Rather, he predicts a
series of punitive measures and countermeasures if the ruling
is adverse to the European Union (p. 149). Indeed, Professor
Bernauer believes that precisely because WTO rules do not
provide clear-cut guidance on who is right or wrong in the case,
and because political resistance on the part of the European
Union is bound to be strong, the WTO is unlikely to invalidate
the European Union’s regulations (pp. 149-61). Nevertheless,
he also believes that the United States may still opt for
escalation (pp. 150, 161-65).
These are dire-sounding predictions indeed. But how likely
are they to come to pass? And, even if matters do unfold as
Professor Bernauer predicts, are the consequences of an
escalation of the dispute as dire as he makes them sound? As
American baseball icon Yogi Berra is famously rumored to have
said, “It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the
future.”3 Berra is also credited with saying, “You can observe a
lot just by watching.”4 If the accuracy of Professor Bernauer’s
predictions was all that was at stake, perhaps the most prudent
course for both reviewer and reader of his book would be to
withhold judgment until the report of the WTO dispute panel
issues. However, the urgency of the policy reforms that he lays
out in Chapter 7 for avoiding a further escalation of this global
controversy depends, not just on how accurately he has
predicted the outcome in the current WTO dispute, but also on
the severity of the consequences flowing from any resulting
escalation of this or other trade disputes. Thus, Professor
Bernauer’s predictions are useful, if only to identify what these
consequences might be.
Professor Bernauer himself hedges a bit on his prediction
as to the likely outcome in the WTO dispute, stating at one
point that it appears “all but certain” that the United States
would win the legal case (p. 155).
Bernauer bases his
prediction on the outcome of three previous food safety cases
resolved by the WTO dispute settlement procedure, each at
least partially invalidating national regulations (p. 155).
3. See, e.g., Humorous Quotes Attributed to Yogi Berra, at
http://www.workinghumor.com/quotes/yogi_berra.shtml (last visited Feb. 27,
2005).
4. Id. But in fairness to Berra, see id. (“I never said most of the things I
said.”).
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However, he quickly reverses field, arguing that the evidence in
these three cases instead suggests that the United States
would not prevail in its dispute with the European Union, at
least in part because there is no formal moratorium in the
European Union, but only a slowdown in approvals that is
temporary (albeit now in its seventh year) (p. 155).
More to the point, Professor Bernauer apparently embraces
public choice theory to back his claim that the WTO is unlikely
to rule against the European Union, arguing that both national
and international courts “usually behave as strategic actors
that attempt to strike a balance between legal consistency and
political support” (p. 157).5 Indeed, he believes that the
outcome of the growth hormone case, in which the European
Union initially refused to make any concessions leading the
United States to impose punitive measures on the order of $120
million per year on European Union countries (p. 161),6 is
likely to deter WTO decision-makers from ruling against the
European Union in a comparable case (p. 161). Yet as
Professor Bernauer himself recognizes, public choice theory
cuts two ways: while courts that rule too often and in costly
ways against politically influential actors risk undermining
their long-term viability, courts that bow too much to political
pressure risk losing their legitimacy as independent and
impartial arbitrators (p. 157). Bernauer estimates that the
non-compliance with an adverse WTO ruling will cost the
5. Public choice theory, which is said to have originated with the
publication of James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock’s The Calculus of
Consent: Logical Foundations of a Constitutional Democracy, applies the same
principles that economists use to analyze people’s action in the marketplace to
analyze people’s action in collective decision-making. See Jane S. Shaw,
Public Choice Theory, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, THE
LIBRARY
OF
ECONOMICS
AND
LIBERTY,
available
at
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PublicChoiceTheory.html (last visited Feb.
27, 2005).
6. Interestingly, however, on November 10, 2004, the European Union
requested consultations, and on January 14, 2005, filed a request for
establishment of a panel to examine the continued suspension of obligations in
the hormones dispute, claiming to have removed the measure found
inconsistent with its obligations, thus rendering the American suspension of
obligations no longer justified. The request states that the United States
disagrees and denies that the new European Union measure is “based on
science” or that it implements the Dispute Settlement Body’s
recommendations and rulings.
See Requests for Consultations by the
European Communities, United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations
in the EC – Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/1, WT/DS320/6 (Nov. 8, 2004),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm
(last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
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European Union something on the order of $300 million per
year (p. 162), or slightly more than twice the yearly cost of noncompliance with the growth hormone decision. However, it is
not obvious to this observer that this prospect alone will be
enough to deter the WTO from ruling against the European
Union, particularly now that the European Union claims
(though not to the satisfaction of the United States) to have
complied with the WTO mandate in the growth hormone case.7
To the contrary, if the WTO dispute panel concludes that the
two cases are indeed comparable, European Union reluctance
to comply with the earlier order would seem to provide all the
more reason for the WTO not to back down in this case.
Nor do the probable consequences of an escalation of the
dispute—irrespective of how the WTO rules—appear to this
observer to be as dire as Professor Bernauer makes them out to
be. The punitive measures that he predicts if the European
Union loses the WTO case turn out to be “imposing all sorts of
economic costs on the United States in other areas, for
example, in the form of escalating other trade disputes” (p.
162). However, because neither the European Union nor the
United States has a particularly commendable record in taking
its own international trade obligations seriously or complying
speedily with WTO rulings,8 the escalation of these disputes
through the formal dispute resolution mechanisms of the WTO
would not necessarily be a bad thing. Professor Bernauer also
suggests that an adverse ruling might strengthen opposition in
the European Union to further liberalization of agricultural
trade, causing the current talks on this sensitive issue to
7. See id.
8. For American non-compliance, see generally United States - Section
110(5)
of
US
Copyright
Act,
WT/DS160,
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm. In February
4, 1999, the European Community brought a complaint challenging the 1998
Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998 as inconsistent with Article 30 of the
WTO TRIPS Agreement. See Request for Consultations by the European
Communities and their Member States, WT/DS160/1 (Feb. 4, 1999), available
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm. On June
15, 2000 the United States was given until July 27, 2001 to comply. See
Report of the Panel, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm.
On
November 9, 2001, the European Community was awarded $1.1 million for
nullified or impaired benefits. See Award of Arbitrators, WT/DS160/ARB25/1
(Nov.
9,
2001),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm. As of Feb.
15, 2005, Section 110(5) of the 1976 Copyright Act, as amended in 1998,
remains unchanged.
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“almost certainly collapse” (p. 162). But notwithstanding the
deadlock at the 2003 Cancun Ministerial Conference,9 caused
in part by disagreements over liberalization of agricultural
trade, that deadlock was subsequently broken on August 1,
2004 with the announcement of the approval of a package of
agreements, including a framework to be used to complete the
“modalities” on agricultural liberalization.10 It is not clear to
this observer that an adverse WTO decision in the United
States-European Union agri-biotech dispute would endanger
the July 2004 package, particularly as the liberalization of
agricultural trade appears to be more important to developing
countries than it is to the United States. As Professor
Bernauer himself recognizes, the European Union, like the
United States, is busily seeking developing-country allies in the
escalating global dispute over agricultural biotechnology (p.
164).
While Professor Bernauer does not specify what
consequences, other than the possible escalation of other trade
disputes, will flow from a WTO decision adverse to the United
States, he does observe that the United States’s case against
the European Union is apparently targeting not just the
European Union agri-biotech regulations but all European
environmental and consumer risk regulations based on the
precautionary principle rather than on what the United States
calls “sound science” (p. 167). Certainly, this conclusion seems
to be confirmed by the latest developments in the European
Union-United States growth hormone dispute. But whether or
not the United States wins the agri-biotech case against the
European Union, it will undoubtedly continue to pursue the
growth hormone case. Beyond pursuing this and other trade
disputes through the WTO dispute settlement process, it is not
clear what other means of “escalation” are available to the
United States as a practical matter, short of abandoning the
WTO framework altogether.
Even if the consequences of possible escalation of this or
other trade disputes are not as dire as Professor Bernauer

9. See WORLD TRADE ORG., CANCUN DEADLOCK: SEPTEMBER 2003, at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd22_cancun_e.htm
(updated Dec. 1, 2004).
10. See WORLD TRADE ORG., THE JULY 2004 PACKAGE AND AUGUST
DECISION,
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd23_julypack_e.htm
(updated Dec. 1, 2004).
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implies, the policy reforms he lays out in Chapter 7 for avoiding
a further escalation of the global controversy over agricultural
biotechnology nevertheless bear careful examination. He is
certainly correct that regulatory polarization and trade conflict
threaten the global prospects for agricultural biotechnology,
due to possible exacerbation of domestic controversies involving
the technology, fragmentation of markets, reduction of
investment in the market, and stagnation of the market (p.
168). He is also probably correct that the reforms he proposes
are a reasonable price to pay for long-term consumer confidence
and investment in the technology (p. 173).
The policy reforms Professor Bernauer proposes are of
three sorts—1) strengthening national and supranational
regulatory authorities; 2) promoting market-driven product
differentiation; and 3) providing greater agri-biotech support
for developing countries (pp. 174-84). As for the first, he
recommends the establishment of politically independent and
science-oriented regulatory authorities with substantial
regulatory powers along the lines of the United States Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) (p. 174).
While he
acknowledges that the FDA has been widely criticized for close
industry ties, deficiencies in involving non-industry interest
groups, and lax regulation of agricultural biotechnology based
exclusively on the principle of substantial equivalence, he
nevertheless believes that the FDA. can still serve as a role
model for other countries.11
Professor Bernauer believes that it is equally important
that the government more actively support market-driven
product differentiation, key elements of which are identity
preservation and labeling (p. 175). He makes a strong case for
the proposition that voluntary negative labeling—that is,
allowing producers, subject to certain constraints and quality
controls, to label their products as free of genetically modified
organisms—is not an adequate solution, as it would impose
labeling costs exclusively on producers and consumers of nongenetically engineered (GE) crops (p. 177).12 Instead, he
11. For a discussion of proposed principles governing the assessment of
environmental risks posed by agricultural technology, see Charles Benbrook,
Principles Governing the Long-Run Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Agricultural
Biotechnology,
available
at
http://law.wustl.edu/centeris/Confpapers/benbrook.html (last visited Feb. 27,
2005).
12. For a discussion of the current state of American law regarding
labeling, see Neil D. Hamilton, Forced Feeding: Inventorying New Legal Issues
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proposes that the cost of identity preservation and labeling be
spread evenly, by developing three categories of products: 1)
those containing no GE organisms (with tolerance levels close
to zero percent); 2) those containing small amounts of GE
organisms (with tolerance levels lower than one percent); and
3) those containing GE organisms for specified purposes (p.
178). He concedes that this proposal will require substantial
reforms in the United States and other countries with lax agribiotech regulations (p. 179),13 and that it might also exacerbate
existing market concentration, as large United States
producers and food processors would be better able to adapt to
the new regulatory environment than would smaller United
States-based processors and farmers, thus necessitating either
stricter regulation of market concentration or government
support for on-farm storage facilities and movement of grains
directly to processors (p. 180). Professor Bernauer also notes
that market-driven product differentiation will thrive only if
the products, product related research and development, and
production processes are safe and GE products confer obvious
benefits on consumers (p. 180).
Finally, Professor Bernauer notes that increased
investment in research and development and marketing of GE
products that provide compelling benefits for developing
countries would help increase public acceptance of the
technology, which thus far has primarily benefited
industrialized world agricultural producers, rather than
promoting food security in the developing world (p. 182-83).
Public-private research partnerships would contribute to
alleviating concerns, particularly in the developing world,
about “enclosure of the genetic commons” and dominance of the
food supply by “gene giants” (p. 183). Many developing
countries will need financial and technical assistance from the
industrialized world in establishing effective regulatory
mechanisms; however, avoiding regulatory failures there and
elsewhere is clearly in the long-term interest of the producers
of GE products (p. 183).
Professor Bernauer is certainly correct when he states that
neither the proponents nor the opponents of agricultural
biotechnology will likely embrace the implementation of his
in the Biotechnology Policy Debate, 17 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y. (forthcoming
2005), available at http://law.wustl.edu/centeris/Confpapers/hamilton.html
(last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
13. See id.
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proposals with much enthusiasm, but he is also correct that
this his proposals are probably the best that either can
realistically hope for (p. 184). Europeans would do well to heed
his admonitions about the naivety of efforts to establish
complex and costly regulations that are difficult to implement
and increasingly divorced from scientific evidence of health and
environmental risks (p. 184). At the same time, Americans who
take seriously the need to listen a bit more closely to what
Europeans have to say over the next four years would do well to
heed his admonition that it is equally naïve, and even
dangerous, for the promoters of agricultural biotechnology “to
assume that bullying agri-biotech critical countries into more
permissive regulation, pouring millions of dollars into pro-agribiotech public relations campaigns and promising ever greater
benefits and low risks of future GE products will resolve the
current crisis” (p. 184).

